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Abstract
This paper uses a simple model of duopoly competition to study the market provision of
program quality offered by television broadcasters under three different regimes. In regime 1, two
broadcasters are financed only with subscription fees (i.e., fee-based or pay TV). In regime 2, the
two broadcasters generate their revenues only from advertising (i.e., free TV). In regime 3, one pay
TV broadcaster competes with one free TV broadcaster. We show that the broadcasters in regime
3 (but not in regimes 1 and 2) vertically differentiate their channel programs if, for a given level of
advertising market profitability, viewers strongly or weakly dislike the presence of advertising. In
such cases, although the two pay TV broadcasters in regime 1 will unambiguously offer higher or
lower quality programming than the two free TV broadcasters under regime 2, it is not clear which
broadcaster will provide higher or lower program quality in regime 3 because this depends on the
degree of horizontal differentiation between the channel programs. However, the levels of quality
offered under regimes 1 and 2 fall between the quality levels offered by the two broadcasters in
regime 3.
KEYWORDS: television broadcasting, quality provision, advertising, media
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1 Introduction
Television broadcasters differ in their revenue sources. Pay TV broadcasters gen-
erate their revenues from viewer subscription fees, whereas free TV broadcasters
are funded by advertising. Pay TV broadcasters operate in a traditional one-sided
market in which they sell their products (i.e., television programs) directly to view-
ers for a given fee. Free TV broadcasters do business in a two-sided market in
which they serve two distinct groups of consumers: viewers and advertisers. Free
TV broadcasters provide television programs to potential viewers for free and sell
adverting space to advertisers.1
Indirect network externalities affect the relationship between viewers and
advertisers. Viewers typically view advertising as a nuisance because it interrupts
the broadcasted programming; the viewer’s time budget is not unlimited. Thus, all
else being equal, viewers prefer to watch programs on channels that carry less or
no advertising. In contrast, advertisers are interested in sending their messages to
as many viewers as possible.
The purpose of this paper was to study competition between television broad-
casters, with a focus on the market provision of program quality. We propose a
simple model of duopoly competition following a Hotelling approach. The broad-
casters are horizontally differentiated at an exogenous level, and the quality levels
of the channel programs are determined endogenously. We considered three differ-
ent regimes. Under regime 1, two pay TV broadcasters compete for viewers. Under
regime 2, competition exists between two free TV broadcasters. Under regime 3,
one pay TV broadcaster competes with one free TV broadcaster. In this way, we
investigated how different market structures affect the provision of program quality.
This paper is part of the burgeoning literature on media economics and two-
sided markets. Theoretical research on the economics of media markets mostly ad-
dresses welfare analysis and the choice of media firms regarding program diversity
and advertising. Gabszewicz et al. (2002) showed that when a newspaper generates
advertising revenue, considerable consequences ensue with regard to the position-
ing of the newspaper’s political opinion.2 Under certain circumstances, newspapers
have an incentive to minimize the diversity of political opinion. These findings
are revolutionary because, according to the solution to the classical location game
presented by d’Aspremont et al. (1979), newspapers will always display maximal
diversity in political opinion in the absence of advertising revenue. Gal-Or and
Dukes (2003) examined a model of location choice in commercial media markets
1Although viewers are not subjected to a monetary charge, they are indirectly charged because they
are forced to watch advertising. However, viewers may be able to skip through advertising breaks
by recording programs to watch ex post. We do not consider such situations.
2See also Gabszewicz et al. (2001).
1
Lin: Broadcasting Competition
and showed that the media have an incentive to minimize the extent of differentia-
tion among themselves; that is, free media firms tend to offer similar content.
Anderson and Coate (2005) presented a theory of the market provision of
broadcasting to address the nature of market failure in that industry. They demon-
strated that equilibrium advertising levels and the equilibrium amount of program-
ming may be too low or too high, depending on the nuisance cost of advertising for
viewers, the substitutability of programs, and the expected benefits to advertisers
from reaching viewers through broadcasting. Peitz and Valletti (2008) showed that
if viewers strongly dislike advertising, the advertising level under free TV is higher
than under pay TV.3 They also showed that free TV broadcasters tend to provide
less differentiated content, whereas pay TV broadcasters always maximally differ-
entiate their content. Crampes et al. (2009) developed a model of media competition
with free entry assuming that media platforms are financed both from advertising
receipts and customer subscriptions.4 They analyzed how two-sided financing in-
fluences quantity and price competition as well as conditions of entry and exit.
The emergence of a theory of two-sided markets over the last decade has
had a significant impact on research regarding the economics of media industries.5
The interdependence of the two distinct sides of the market (i.e., viewers and adver-
tisers) and the existence of indirect network externalities are characteristic of media
industries, which form a typical example of two-sided markets.6 As noted by Peitz
and Valletti (2008), the two-sided nature of media industries has not been consid-
ered in earlier contributions to the literature regarding media economics.7 Thus, a
theory of two-sided markets allows a more complete picture of media economics to
be drawn.
However, little attention has been paid to the study of endogenous quality
provisions by media firms in the existing literature. This paper seeks to fill that gap.
The model used in this paper is closely related to the model developed by Arm-
strong (2005), who showed that program quality is higher in a pay TV regime than
in a free TV regime. In his paper, pay TV broadcasters placed advertising on their
channels, whereas in our paper, this is not the case. We thus consider pure subscrip-
3Note that in their model, pay TV broadcasters generated revenues from both viewers and advertis-
ers. Moreover, in their study, duopoly competition is captured in two separate regimes, one with
two pay TV broadcasters and one with two free TV broadcasters.
4They also considered competition between free media platforms.
5For examples of the theoretical literature on two-sided markets, see Rochet and Tirole (2003),
Wright (2004), Armstrong (2006), Hagiu (2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007), Belleflamme and
Toulemonde (2009), Rysman (2009), and Weyl (2010).
6For empirical evidence, see, for example, Rysman (2004), Kaiser and Wright (2006), and Kaiser
and Song (2009).
7Earlier contributions to the literature regarding media economics include Steiner (1952), Beebe
(1977), and Spence and Owen (1977).
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tion TV without advertising. Moreover, Armstrong (2005) considered two separate
regimes in which competition took place either between two pay TV broadcasters
or between two free TV broadcasters. However, in reality, pay TV and free TV
channels often coexist and compete for viewers in the same market. We thus extend
this analysis by introducing asymmetric competition, that is, competition between
one pay TV and one free TV broadcaster based on a duopoly model.
The three different regimes represent three different broadcasting industry
structures. With this set-up, we can compare program quality under pay TV with
that under free TV from two perspectives. First, we can compare program quality
provided in a pure pay TV industry with program quality provided in a pure free
TV industry (i.e., regime 1 versus regime 2). Second, under regime 3, we are also
able to compare the program quality provided by a pay TV broadcaster with that of-
fered by a free TV broadcaster in the same industry. The former is a cross-industry
comparison, whereas the latter is an intra-industry comparison. Moreover, we can
also compare all three regimes with one another.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
basic model. In Section 3, we conduct equilibrium analysis and present the results.
Section 4 concludes the analysis and provides suggestions for future research.
2 The model
Suppose that there are two competing channels owned by two different for-profit
broadcasters. Let us first consider the case of symmetric competition between two
pay TV broadcasters under regime 1. The mass of viewers is normalized to 1.
Suppose that the viewers are uniformly distributed along the unit interval (i.e., the
Hotelling segment) and that the two TV channels i and j are located at the two ends
of the interval. The location of channel i is x= 0, whereas that of channel j is x= 1.
The viewers incur a linear transportation cost of t > 0 per unit of length; that is, a
viewer situated at x in the unit interval has a transportation cost of tx when view-
ing programming on channel i and a transportation cost of t(1  x) when viewing
programming on channel j. Hence, there is an exogenous level of horizontal pro-
gram differentiation between the two channels. A lower transport cost of t implies
that the programs on the two channels are closer substitutes from the perspective of
viewers. Moreover, each viewer chooses only one of the two channels to watch. It
is an "either-or" decision.
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channel i or j:8
uiv = s+q
i  piv  tx; u jv = s+q j  p jv  t(1  x); (1)
where qi and q j are the endogenously determined levels of program quality for
the two channels. The subscription fees, which are presented as a lump sum, are
characterized by piv and p
j
v. Throughout the entire analysis, the viewers derive an
intrinsic value s> 0 from watching TV, which is assumed to be sufficiently large so
that the viewer market is fully covered. Moreover, we assume that no broadcaster in
all three regimes can corner the viewer market; that is, each broadcaster captures a
positive market share. Based on the net utility functions in (1), the location x of the
marginal viewer who is indifferent toward joining channel i or channel j is given
by:
x=
1
2
+
qi q j  piv+ p jv
2t
: (2)
Therefore, one can easily derive the following viewer demand functions:
niv = x; n
j
v = 1  x: (3)
For the sake of simplicity, suppose that the broadcasters incur no marginal
cost for serving viewers and that fixed entry costs are not a factor in the analysis.
Moreover, assume that the broadcasters face the quadratic fixed costs 12c(q
i)2 and
1
2c(q
j)2 with c> 0 as program quality increases. As a result, broadcaster profits are
given by:
pi i
 
qi;q j; piv; p
j
v

=
1
2
+
qi q j  piv+ p jv
2t
!
piv 
1
2
c(qi)2; (4)
pi j
 
qi;q j; piv; p
j
v

=
1
2
+
q j qi  p jv+ piv
2t
!
p jv 
1
2
c(q j)2: (5)
Note that all profit functions throughout the entire analysis are assumed to be con-
cave functions in the sense that the second-order conditions for global maxima are
satisfied. Moreover, the consumers (that is, the viewers) enjoy the following surplus
under regime 1:
CS=
Z x
0
 
s+qi  piv  tz

dz+
Z 1
x
 
s+q j  p jv  t(1  z)

dz: (6)
8For similar utility and demand motivations with endogenous quality choice in a Hotelling setting,
see Sanjo (2007).
A viewer situated at x2 [0;1] derives the following net utility when watching
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We now analyze an industry consisting of two competing free TV channels
under regime 2. Maintaining all assumptions and notations designated above, the
net utility functions in (1) become:
uiv = s+q
i  γnia  tx; u jv = s+q j  γn ja  t(1  x): (7)
The viewers are assumed to dislike advertising. Parameter γ > 0 measures the per-
ceived nuisance cost per advertisement. The number of advertisements broadcast
on each channel is denoted by nia and n
j
a. The location bx of the marginal viewer who
is indifferent between the two free TV channels is given by:
bx= 1
2
+
qi q j  γnia+ γn ja
2t
: (8)
The market shares of the broadcasters are as follows:
niv = x; n
j
v = 1 b bx: (9)
It is reasonable that an advertiser’s willingness to pay increases with the
number of viewers that the advertiser can reach. We thus assume that each broad-
caster’s advertising revenue is proportional to the number of viewers it has at-
tracted. If a broadcaster decides to carry na advertisements on its channel, then
it receives advertising revenue of R(na) per viewer.9 For simplicity’s sake, sup-
pose that there are constant returns for broadcast advertising, that is, R(na) = kna
and R0(na) = k > 0. The parameter k is the broadcaster’s unit advertising receipt,
which measures the profitability of the advertising market. Following the existing
literature, we assume that the broadcasters do not compete for advertisers.10 The
broadcaster profits are given by:
pi i
 
qi;q j;nia;n
j
a

=
1
2
+
qi q j  γnia+ γn ja
2t
!
knia 
1
2
c(qi)2; (10)
pi j
 
qi;q j;nia;n
j
a

=
1
2
+
q j qi  γn ja+ γnia
2t
!
kn ja 
1
2
c(q j)2: (11)
9Assume that the free TV broadcasters have reliable technologies to exactly measure the number of
viewers watching their channels.
10This setting is known as a competitive bottleneck model in the literature regarding two-sided
markets; see Armstrong (2006).
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The consumer surplus under regime 2 is given by:
cCS= Z bx
0
 
s+qi  γnia  tz

dz+
Z 1
bx
 
s+q j  γn ja  t(1  z)

dz: (12)
Finally, let us consider the asymmetric competition between one pay TV
and one free TV broadcaster under regime 3. Suppose that the pay TV broadcaster
is denoted by i and the free TV broadcaster is denoted by j. Our notation can
be borrowed from the symmetric regimes analyzed above. We thus modify the
viewer’s net utility functions in (1) or (7) to:
uiv = s+q
i  piv  tx; u jv = s+q j  γn ja  t(1  x): (13)
The marginal viewer is located at ex, which is given by:
ex= 1
2
+
qi q j  piv+ γn ja
2t
: (14)
The broadcasters capture the following market shares:
niv = x; n
j
v = 1 e ex: (15)
The profits of the broadcasters are given by:
pi i
 
qi;q j; piv;n
j
a

=
1
2
+
qi q j  piv+ γn ja
2t
!
piv 
1
2
c(qi)2; (16)
pi j
 
qi;q j; piv;n
j
a

=
1
2
+
q j qi  γn ja+ piv
2t
!
kn ja 
1
2
c(q j)2: (17)
The consumer surplus under regime 3 is given by:
fCS= Z ex
0
 
s+qi  piv  tz

dz+
Z 1
ex
 
s+q j  γn ja  t(1  z)

dz: (18)
3 Equilibrium analysis
For the purpose of explanation, in this section, we conduct an equilibrium analysis
by assuming simultaneous games. However, we obtain qualitatively very similar
results when we assume sequential games.11 Sequential games assume that the
11Proofs for the sequential games are available from the author upon request.
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quality levels of the channel programs are set before the subscription fee (and/or
the advertising intensity) is set.
Under regime 1, the pay TV broadcasters simultaneously choose the level
of program quality and the subscription fee. Given the profit functions in (4) and
(5), the broadcasters solve the following profit maximization problems:
max
qi>0; piv>0
pi i
 
qi;q j; piv; p
j
v

=
1
2
+
qi q j  piv+ p jv
2t
!
piv 
1
2
c(qi)2;
max
q j>0; p jv>0
pi j
 
qi;q j; piv; p
j
v

=
1
2
+
q j qi  p jv+ piv
2t
!
p jv 
1
2
c(q j)2:
After solving the corresponding first-order conditions and conducting a few addi-
tional computations, we formulate the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Under the unique equilibrium of regime 1, the two competing pay TV
broadcasters choose
qi = q j =
1
2c
and piv = p jv = t; (19)
such that
niv = n
j
v =
1
2
and pi i = pi j = 4ct 18c : (20)
The following assumption ensures that the second-order conditions are sat-
isfied:12
4ct > 1: (21)
Note that assumption (21) also guarantees positive equilibrium profits. Moreover,
the following condition ensures that the viewer market is fully covered:
1+2cs 3ct: (22)
We now discuss properties of the equilibrium solutions given in (19) and (20). It
is intuitively clear that when the cost of a quality provision is higher, the level of
program quality offered by the broadcasters will be lower under equilibrium condi-
tions. Surprisingly, a higher value of c will increase equilibrium profits. When both
broadcasters face higher costs for increasing program quality, then a strategic effect
exists that reduces competition, and as a result, equilibrium profits will increase.
12That is, the partial second own derivatives are negative, and the determinant of the Hessian matrix
is positive.
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The transportation cost t has a similar strategic effect. A higher value of t indi-
cates that the programs on both channels are less replaceable because they are more
horizontally differentiated. A higher level of program differentiation softens price
competition such that the broadcasters can charge higher equilibrium subscription
fees and achieve higher equilibrium profits. Note that the broadcasters share the
viewer market equally.
We now consider the equilibrium analysis for regime 2. The choice vari-
ables for the two competing free TV broadcasters are program quality level and the
number of advertisements to be placed. The profit maximization problems are as
follows:
max
qi>0; nia>0
pi i
 
qi;q j;nia;n
j
a

=
1
2
+
qi q j  γnia+ γn ja
2t
!
knia 
1
2
c(qi)2;
max
q j>0; n ja>0
pi j
 
qi;q j;nia;n
j
a

=
1
2
+
q j qi  γn ja+ γnia
2t
!
kn ja 
1
2
c(q j)2:
After solving the corresponding first-order conditions and making a few further
computations, we formulate the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Under the unique equilibrium of regime 2, the two competing free TV
broadcasters choose
qi =b bq j = k
2cγ
and bnia = bn ja = tγ ; (23)
such that bniv = bn jv = 12 and bpi i = bpi j = k (4ctγ  k)8cγ2 : (24)
The following assumption is necessary so that the second-order conditions
are satisfied:13
4ctγ > k: (25)
All viewers enter the market if:
k+2csγ  3ctγ: (26)
For the same reasons as those described above regarding the pay TV regime, equi-
librium program quality decreases and equilibrium profits increase in c. A higher
t now allows the broadcasters to increase their amount of advertising (substituting
13It also guarantees positive equilibrium profits.
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for the subscription fee charged by the pay TV broadcasters in regime 1), leading to
higher equilibrium profits. A higher γ means that viewers are less willing to watch
the program assuming a given number of advertisements and level of program qual-
ity. The direct consequence is that the broadcasters will reduce the number of ad-
vertisements. The broadcasters will thus have an incentive to lower their program
quality level.
We further derive that:
∂bpi i
∂k =
∂bpi j
∂k > 0 and
∂bpi i
∂γ
=
∂bpi j
∂γ
< 0
!
, t > k
2cγ
: (27)
A higher level of unit advertising receipts k (that is, a more profitable advertis-
ing market) will induce broadcasters to provide higher quality programs. Because
advertising revenues depend positively on audience size, broadcasters have a vital
interest in attracting more viewers by offering higher quality programs. However,
this does not necessarily mean that equilibrium profits clearly increase in k. On the
one hand, a higher k leads to higher quality programs and thus attracts more view-
ers, thereby generating higher advertising revenues. On the other hand, however,
higher levels of c and γ will lower the program quality and reduce the number of
advertisements and, thus, advertising revenues. Therefore, (27) implies that equi-
librium profits increase in k if and only if t is sufficiently large (t > k2cγ ). The reason
is that if the channel programs are sufficiently horizontally differentiated, then the
competition for viewers is lessened and more viewers are able to enjoy the pro-
grams. As a result, broadcasters can afford to use more advertisements and thus
generate higher profits under equilibrium conditions.
We now compare the two symmetric regimes with respect to program qual-
ity. By comparing (19) and (23), we observe that two competing free TV broad-
casters will offer higher quality programs than two pay TV broadcasters if γ is low
relative to k (γ < k). In this context, a lower level of γ leads to more advertising such
that free TV broadcasters can make higher advertising revenues for a given level of
k. As a result, free TV broadcasters have a stronger incentive to offer higher qual-
ity programs than do pay TV broadcasters to compensate the viewers for watching
more advertising. In contrast, if γ is high relative to k (γ > k), then advertising
revenues are limited due to the reduced advertising intensity and the low level of
k. As a result, free TV broadcasters will decrease program quality to a lower level
than that offered by pay TV broadcasters. However, if neither of these two effects
dominates (γ = k), then the equilibrium level for program quality will be the same
under the pay TV and free TV regimes.
Equivalently, we can state that whether the equilibrium program quality pro-
vided in a pure pay TV industry is higher (or lower) than in a pure free TV industry
9
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crucially depends on how strongly viewers dislike advertising for a given level of
advertising market profitability. If the nuisance cost of advertising for viewers is
high (or low), then a pure free TV industry will offer a lower (or higher) level of
program quality than a pure pay TV industry. However, if the nuisance cost of ad-
vertising for viewers is at a medium-level, then a pure pay TV industry will provide
the same level of program quality as a pure free TV industry.
We now show that these findings regarding the quality comparison between
pay TV and free TV are not complete under asymmetric competition. Under regime
3, the pay TV broadcaster i chooses a subscription fee, and the free TV broadcaster
j chooses an advertising amount in addition to their respective program quality
choices. Thus, the two broadcasters solve the following profit maximization prob-
lems:
max
qi>0; piv>0
pi i
 
qi;q j; piv;n
j
a

=
1
2
+
qi q j  piv+ γn ja
2t
!
piv 
1
2
c(qi)2;
max
q j>0; n ja>0
pi j
 
qi;q j; piv;n
j
a

=
1
2
+
q j qi  γn ja+ piv
2t
!
kn ja 
1
2
c(q j)2:
After solving the corresponding first-order conditions and conducting a few
additional computations, we formulate the following lemma:
Lemma 3 Under the unique equilibrium of regime 3, the two competing pay TV
and free TV broadcasters choose
eqi = k 3ctγ
c(k+ γ 6ctγ) ;eq j = k 3kctc(k+ γ 6ctγ) ; and (28)
epiv = 2t (k 3ctγ)k+ γ 6ctγ ; en ja = 2t (1 3ct)k+ γ 6ctγ ; (29)
such that
eniv = k 3ctγk+ γ 6ctγ ; en jv = γ 3ctγk+ γ 6ctγ ; and (30)
epi i = (4ct 1)(k 3ctγ)2
2c(k+ γ 6ctγ)2 ;
epi j = k (4ctγ  k)(1 3ct)2
2c(k+ γ 6ctγ)2 : (31)
Note that the second-order conditions are satisfied if assumptions (21) and
(25) hold. Moreover, to ensure positive equilibrium solutions in (28)-(31), we must
assume in addition to (21) and (25) that:
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(k+ γ 6ctγ)(k 3ctγ) > 0; (32)
(k+ γ 6ctγ)(1 3ct) > 0: (33)
Moreover, full coverage of the viewer market requires:
k (1+ c(s 3t))+ c(s 6cst+3t (3ct 1))γ
(k+ γ 6ctγ)  0: (34)
For the purpose of explanation, we briefly summarize our main findings
regarding quality provisions in the following proposition before continuing to a
detailed analysis.
Proposition 1 The broadcasters in regime 3 (but not in regimes 1 and 2) will verti-
cally differentiate their channel programs if, for a given level of advertising market
profitability, viewers strongly or weakly dislike the presence of advertising. In such
cases, although the two pay TV broadcasters in regime 1 will unambiguously of-
fer higher or lower levels of program quality than the two free TV broadcasters in
regime 2, it is not clear which broadcaster will provide higher or lower program
quality in regime 3 because this depends on the degree of horizontal differentiation
between the channel programs. However, the quality levels offered under regimes 1
and 2 fall between the levels of quality offered by the two broadcasters in regime 3.
For expositional sake, we present Figure 1 below to illustrate the findings
given in Proposition 1. We now compare pay TV with free TV in regime 3. From
Lemma 3, we derive:
qi >e q j;e niv >e en jv ; epi i > epi j i f (k  γ) [k  (6ct 1)γ]> 0: (35)
There are obviously two critical values of k in (35), namely, k1 = γ and k2 =
(6ct 1)γ . One can easily check that k1 > k2 if 3ct < 1 and k1 < k2 if 3ct > 1,
where 3ct = 1 is impossible because of the parameter restriction in (33). As pre-
sented in Figure 1, depending on whether 3ct < 1 or 3ct > 1, there are two possible
situations that satisfy expression (35). The parameter restrictions in (32), (33), and
(34) imply that k 6= (6ct 1)γ , and thus, a corresponding line does not exist in
Figure 1. Moreover, (33) also suggests that if 3ct < 1, then k > (6ct 1)γ , or if
3ct > 1, then k < (6ct 1)γ . It naturally follows that in the same way as under
symmetric regimes 1 and 2, the incentives for pay TV and free TV broadcasters to
provide program quality under asymmetric competition coincide for k= γ (see area
I in Figure 1). In equilibrium, the two broadcasters equally share the viewer market
and earn the same profits.
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Figure 1: Market provision of program quality
However, this picture changes if γ is low or high relative to k. We first ana-
lyze the scenario in which the nuisance cost of advertising for viewers is relatively
low (γ < k) and the channel programs are not sufficiently horizontally differentiated
(3ct < 1 , t < 13c ). This scenario is depicted as area II in Figure 1. In this case,
viewers are less likely to pay the subscription fee and join the pay TV channel for
the same level of program quality because the channel programs of both pay TV and
free TV are similar, and the advertisements do not cause excessive annoyance. This
fact naturally leads to the equilibrium outcome that the pay TV broadcaster must
offer higher quality programming than its free TV counterpart. Otherwise, there
is no justification for the existence of pay TV. However, in pursuing higher-quality
12
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programming in competition with free TV, the pay TV broadcaster can attract more
viewers and make a higher profit.
However, if by γ < k the channel programs are sufficiently horizontally dif-
ferentiated (3ct > 1 , t > 13c ), then both the pay TV and free TV broadcasters
have a certain level of local monopoly power over the provision of quality. The
pay TV broadcaster is not required to provide higher quality programming and has
less incentive to do so. Given that the nuisance cost of advertising for viewers is
relatively low, the free TV broadcaster will dominate the market by offering higher
quality programming. The pay TV broadcaster captures a smaller market share by
providing a lower level of programming quality on its channel. Moreover, because
the nuisance cost of advertising for viewers is relatively low, the free TV broad-
caster generally tends to increase advertising intensity, exerting additional upward
pressure to provide higher quality programming to compensate viewers. This equi-
librium outcome is characterized by area V in Figure 1.
We now analyze equilibrium market outcomes when k < γ . If the channel
programs are sufficiently horizontally differentiated, the pay TV broadcaster will
provide higher quality programming, attract more viewers, and make a higher profit
than the free TV broadcaster. This is because the nuisance cost of advertising for
viewers is relatively high and advertising intensity on the free TV channel thus
tends to be low. As a result, the free TV broadcaster has a weak incentive to provide
higher quality programming to compensate for advertising and thus attract viewers
because advertising revenues are limited. Moreover, because the channel programs
are sufficiently horizontally differentiated and viewers strongly dislike advertising,
it is difficult for a free TV broadcaster to prevent viewers from joining the pay TV
channel. Therefore, in equilibrium, the pay TV broadcaster dominates the market.
This outcome is described by area IV in Figure 1.
However, if by k < γ the channel programs are not sufficiently horizontally
differentiated, the market equilibrium outcome is reversed. The intuition behind
this dynamic is straightforward; a lack of sufficiently horizontal program differen-
tiation leads to fierce competition for viewers, and viewers are less willing to pay
a subscription fee if they can watch similar programs for free. Despite the high
nuisance cost of advertising, the free TV broadcaster can compensate for this by
offering higher quality programming and thereby dominating the pay TV broad-
caster and attracting more viewers, thus making a higher profit in equilibrium. This
market outcome is illustrated in area III in Figure 1.
We now compare all three regimes with respect to the provision of quality.
Figure 1 illustrates the results. First, let q  qi  q j and bq  bqi  bq j. In
area I, all broadcasters provide the same program quality under all three regimes
(q = q =b qi =e eq j). However, given k 6= γ , the broadcasters under symmetric
competition in regimes 1 and 2 provide higher (or lower) program quality on its
13
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channels than the broadcaster with lower (or higher) quality channel programming
under asymmetric competition in regime 3. To put it more formally, in area II,eq j < q < bq < eqi, whereas eqi < q < bq < eq j holds in area V . Moreover,eqi < bq < q < eq j occurs in area III, whereas eq j < bq < q < eqi exists in area
IV .
Stated differently, given k 6= γ , the quality difference between pay TV and
free TV channel programs under asymmetric competition in regime 3 is larger than
the quality difference between pay TV and free TV channel programs in regimes 1
and 2. The reasoning behind this is straightforward; given k 6= γ , asymmetric com-
petition between pay TV and free TV broadcasters in regime 3 leads to the strategic
behavior of vertical differentiation. In particular, broadcaster profits will be maxi-
mized when the broadcasters offer programs of different quality levels. In contrast,
there is no strategic interaction between the pay TV and free TV broadcasters un-
der symmetric competition because regimes 1 and 2 are separate and independent.
Consequently, an intra-regime comparison between free TV and pay TV broad-
casters implies a larger quality difference between pay TV and free TV. After all,
regime 3 features a direct strategic interaction between pay TV and free TV broad-
casters rather than the cross-regime comparison between the pay TV and free TV
broadcasters under regimes 1 and 2.
As an additional step, we now compare the subscription fee and advertising
intensity under symmetric competition in regimes 1 and 2 with that under asym-
metric competition in regime 3. First, let pv  piv  p jv and bna  bnia  bn ja . We
derive:  
pv < epiv and bna > en ja  i f (k  γ) [k  (6ct 1)γ]> 0: (36)
In the knife-edge case k = γ , the equilibrium subscription fee and advertising in-
tensity are the same in all three regimes. Moreover, by comparing (36) with (35),
we note that the broadcaster with higher quality programming in regime 3 is able to
charge a higher subscription fee or set a higher advertising level than the broadcast-
ers under symmetric competition in regimes 1 and 2. In contrast, the broadcaster
with lower quality programming in regime 3 offers a lower subscription fee or sets
a lower advertising level than do the broadcasters under symmetric competition in
regimes 1 and 2. The reason is simple and arises from Proposition 1; given k 6= γ ,
the quality levels of channel programs in regimes 1 and 2 are ranked between the
quality levels offered by the two broadcasters in regime 3.
Finally, we examine the effects of the three different market structures on
consumer (i.e., viewer) surplus. In which regime and under what circumstances do
viewers enjoy the greatest surplus? First, we compute the equilibrium consumer
surplus in each regime. Inserting the relevant equilibrium solutions from Lemma 1
14
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 11 [2011], Iss. 1 (Contributions), Art. 17
into (6), we calculate that the consumer surplus in regime 1 is given by:
CS = 2+4cs 5ct
4c
> 0: (37)
Equivalently, the consumer surplus in regime 2 is given by:
cCS = 2k+4csγ 5ctγ
4cγ
> 0: (38)
In regime 3, the consumer surplus is given by:
fCS = k2Φ 2kγΩ+ cγ2Ψ
2c(k+ γ 6ctγ)2 > 0; (39)
with
Φ = (2+2cs 5ct) ;
Ω = [ 1 2c(s 6cst+6t (2ct 1))] ;
Ψ =
h
2s(1 6ct)2+ t (6ct (8 15ct) 5)
i
:
From previous analysis, it naturally follows that based on k = γ , the con-
sumer surplus in all three regimes is actually the same. We now consider the case
when k < γ . Here, viewers are clearly better off under regimes 1 and 3 than regime
2.14 Because the nuisance cost of advertising for viewers is relatively high, the addi-
tional benefit of avoiding advertising is so large that viewers clearly prefer regimes
1 and 3, as these regimes provide the pay TV option. Moreover, for the case k < γ ,
it is ambiguous whether the viewers are better off under regime 1 than regime 3:
CS >fCS , 2 k+ γ+18c2t2γ> ct (5k+19γ) : (40)
Two opposing effects are responsible for this finding. Compared to the sym-
metric, pure pay TV regime 1, the channel programs under asymmetric competition
in regime 3 are vertically differentiated, increasing viewer welfare. However, ver-
tical differentiation of channel programs also means that a broadcaster can charge
more from viewers by setting higher subscription fees or enhancing advertising in-
tensity because broadcaster competition is lessened somewhat.
14Formally:

CS;fCS>cCS i f k < γ .
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under regimes 2 and 3 than under the pure pay TV regime, regime 1.15 When the
nuisance cost of advertising for viewers is relatively low, viewers are less willing
to pay the subscription fee necessary to watch a pay TV channel. This effect pre-
dominates such that regime 1, in which there is no free TV available, generates the
lowest surplus. By comparing regimes 2 and 3, we obtain the following for the case
k > γ:
CS

>c fCS , 2 k2+ kγ+18c2t2γ2> ct  5γ2+19kγ : (41)
The explanation applied to (40) can be applied to (41); compared to the symmetric,
pure free TV regime 2, vertical differentiation of the channel programs in regime
3 has both welfare-enhancing and welfare-reducing effects on viewers at the same
time such that direct comparison between the two regimes leads to an ambiguous
result.
4 Conclusion
This paper has presented a stylized model of duopoly competition between TV
broadcasters. The main purpose was to analyze the provision of program quality
by broadcasters in three different market structures. Under regime 1, two pay TV
broadcasters compete for viewers. Under regime 2, there is competition between
two free TV broadcasters. Under regime 3, one pay TV broadcaster competes with
one free TV broadcaster. We show that the incentives to offer programming qual-
ity depend mainly on the nuisance cost of adverting for viewers, the broadcaster’s
marginal return on advertising, and the degree of horizontal differentiation between
the competing channel programs.
Intervention or regulation in the TV broadcasting industry usually empha-
sizes the degree of horizontal differentiation and the quality of channel program-
ming. Policy makers develop initiatives so that diverse and high-quality program-
ming is widely provided to consumers by the market.16 Whereas the diversity of
channel programming (and advertising intensity) has been investigated in the ex-
isting literature, our conceptual framework can serve as a guide for policy makers
interested in to the market behavior of quality provisions. We want to emphasize
two aspects of our analysis.
First, one might assume that program quality under pay TV is higher than
under free TV because viewers are willing to pay a fee for higher quality program-
ming. Armstrong (2005) demonstrated that this is true if pay TV broadcasters also
carry advertising on the channels. However, we have shown that this claim does not
15Formally:
cCS;fCS>CS i f k > γ .
16See also Armstrong (2005).
What happens when k > γ? In this case, the viewers enjoy higher surpluses
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hold under certain circumstances if the pay TV broadcasters do not allow advertis-
ing (that is, pure subscription TV). Second, under certain circumstances, content
regulation with respect to program diversity will also affect the market provision of
program quality in regime 3, but not in regimes 1 and 2. For example, if a policy
maker increases program diversity too much, the quality levels provided by pay TV
and free TV broadcasters will be reversed. This could lead to undesirable welfare
effects from the perspective of the policy maker. Thus, it is essential for policy
makers to consider such cross externalities in content regulation.
We have assumed that viewers watch only one channel, which in some sce-
narios is an appropriate assumption. For example, it is reasonable that a viewer
will choose to watch only one of two movies that are showing at the same time
on different channels. However, viewers often watch several channels sequentially.
For example, a viewer may choose to watch two movies showing sequentially on
different channels if both movies appeal to the viewer. Thus, capturing this type
of viewer behavior would make the model more realistic. Another fruitful direc-
tion for future research would be to incorporate the assumption that viewers have
heterogeneous preferences regarding program quality.
In this study, we also assumed that advertisers are homogeneous. A natural
extension would be the introduction of heterogeneous advertisers with a differen-
tial willingness to pay. One might follow the approaches developed in Armstrong
(2006) and Peitz and Valletti (2008). However, this would lead to serious compu-
tational problems for both simultaneous and sequential games in our setting. For
this reason, this is left for future research. Moreover, we also assumed that the ad-
vertisers place advertising on both channels if they want to reach all viewers (i.e.,
multi-homing advertisers), thus ruling out the possibility of broadcaster competi-
tion on the advertiser side (i.e., single-homing advertisers). Broadcasters have local
monopoly power on the advertiser side. However, it might be interesting to ex-
tend this analysis by introducing broadcaster competition in attracting advertisers.
A more complicated case would be to model the partial multi-homing behavior of
advertisers, which involves both multi-homing advertisers and single-homing ad-
vertisers.
A far more ambitious approach for future research than that presented here
would analyze a larger game with more endogenous decisions made by broadcast-
ers. For example, in stage 1, broadcasters might choose their business model, that
is, either pay TV (with or without advertising) or free TV. In stage 2, the broadcast-
ers would then choose the level of diversity across their channel programs. In stage
3, the broadcasters would decide on which level of program quality to offer, and in
stage 4, the broadcasters would make final decisions to set market pricing and/or
advertising intensity.
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ers. However, public service broadcasters also operate in the markets. One possible
extension could be to introduce asymmetric competition between private for-profit
and public service broadcasters. Depending on the country, public service broad-
casters (such as the BBC in the UK) may be funded by television license fees,
government grants, and public donations. Country-specific differences also exist
regarding advertising and content regulations, for example, regarding whether or
not advertising is allowed, on what level is it allowed, and whether content is reg-
ulated. It is also important to specify the objectives of public service broadcasters
first, as the objective of private broadcasters is clear.
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